Setting price equal to marginal cost can be inefficient.
Marginal cost prices provide the correct allocation of the output from a fixed amount of capital, but may provide the wrong incentives for capital accumulation.
When a seller receives marginal cost, it has an incentive to raise marginal cost by investing too little.
In cases of natural monopoly, certain important economic institutions have arisen to prevent inefficient exploitation of monopoly power. These institutions involve long-term contracts or government regulation. This paper shows that a contract or regulatory procedure granting a seller a price equal to its own marginal cost is inefficient.
On the other hand, marginal cost is the appropriate price to charge purchasers.
Contracts can circumvent the conflict between the need for efficient allocation of output among buyers, which seems to call for marginal-cost pricing, and the need for efficient investment, which excludes marginal-cost pricing. The fully efficient contract charges marginal cost to each purchaser, but provides stable revenue to the seller, so the seller cannot improve profit by deliberately creating a shortage 01-capacity. When demand is strong and all customers are paying premium prices, the excess revenue is returned to the customers as lump-sum rebates, instead of flowing to the firm.
of efficiency--allocation of output and appropriate investment.
They all prevent the seller from profiting from a shortage of capital, but otherwise do not limit the relation between output and revenue.
But I argue that one member at the class of fully efficient contracts has some extra advantages and fits the facts about output and revenue. Under this contract, revenue is strictly proportional to output, or, to put it another way, the "price," in the sense of revenue per Linit of output, is predetermined by the contract (possibly it is indexed to observed input costs). Price rigidity is a feature a-f the contract.
Earlier writers, notably Arthur Okun (1975 Okun ( , 1981 have commented upon the tendency for long-term relations to stabilize unit revenue, but have invoked alternative principles to explain the stability.
Some of the principles are outside the domain of economics, and others, especially those relying on search and in-formation, are yet to be fully developed. The principle studied here is a straightforward economic one.
The sense in which prices are rigid in the model of this paper has no direct Keynesian implications; that is, price rigidity does not lead to disequilibrium in product markets. Though most studies find slightly positive demand effects, they are never close to an elasticity of a half. The expansion of output from 1954 to 1955 was accompanied by a modest increase in prices relative to costs.
Then, as output Steel price is average realized U.S. producers prices of cold-rolled carbon steel sheet, Table A -3. p. 159 in Crandall (1981) .
Cost is U.S. production costs for cold-rolled sheet, The advance information is described by a scalar random variable, u. At production time, the buyers learn their XjS but again, they cannot be verified by the seller.
The quantity delivered to purchaser i is q. The total delivered to all purchasers is 0. Buyer i derives a benefit, V (qi ,x1) from receiving qa. The producer incurs short-run variable costs of C(Q,K,w) plus capital costs of rK. 1< is the capital stock chosen by the producer at investment time. The wage, w, and the price of capital, r, become known after the contracts are signed but before the capital decision is made. The derivative of V with respect to q1 becomes larae without limit as q1 approaches zero and approaches zero as qa becomes large.
The derivative of C with respect to K becomes indefinitely negative as K approaches zero and approaches zero as K becomes large.
The goal of the parties is to set up a procedure to deliver the efficient quantity to each purchaser.
The first concept of efficiency used here is
Definition.
An allocation ot output, q1,... .q. is output-
Note that output efficiency is a property of the allocation ex post, after the demand shifts and factor prices become known.
The following obvious result will be used extensively in the sequel:
There exists a unique output-efficient allocation! characterized by cV C -That is, whatever capital stock has been chosen by the producer, the marginal benefit of output to each purchaser should equal short-run marginal cost at that capital stock.
The second concept of efficiency is
where the expectation is over the distribution of Xi conditional on the in-formation available to the producer at investment time, u, and the qa are the output-efficient levels given K.
The parallel result for capital efficiency is:
There is a unique efficient capital stock, and it satisfies E (-) r
The expected marginal reduction in cost associated with an increase in the capital stock should equal the cost of capital.
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In order to achieve the efficient allocation, the parties agree on a contract. A suitable class of contracts lets the buyer pick the value of q1 subject to making a payment to the seller in the amount Rt (qa ,Q,K,w,r) .
The general argument in favor of a contract that has the buyer choose the quantity appears in Hall and Lilien (1979) in the context of the labor market and in Weitzman (1981) in a setting like this one.
8riefly, when one party observes some private information and the other party is affected by nothing but public information, the first party should make the active choice because it internalizes the influence o-f the private information. What is distinctive and complex about the setup considered in this paper is the investment decision made by the producer after contracts are signed. The total revenue from all its contracts provides an investment incentive to the firm, and the contracts must be designed to provide the right incentive in order to achieve capital efficiency.
There is one minor obstacle to contracting for exact capital efficiency.
As a general matter, the information available to the firm at investment time, indexed by u, may convey more than The preliminary information, u, conveys the scale of the Xj in the sense that the conditional distribution of x.
given u has density ga Xj/U)/U.
(C)
The revenue -Formula R(Q,K,w,r) is homogeneous of degree one in Q and K.
It will turn out to be reasonable to consider contracts in which the quantity choices of the purchasers influence the producer's revenue only through total quantity and not through the vector o-f quantities chosen separately by each purchaser. In this case, the revenue of the producer is a function R(Q,K,w,r).
The producer chooses K to maximize expected profit, If, for example, the formula provides less compensation for the extra output than its marginal cost, then it must provide an offsetting amount of direct compensation for the capital itself.
The property that a formula achieving capital efficiency at u=l also achieves it for any value of u means that the formula need not be contingent on the value of u, which we assume is not public knowledge. Another choice is to make revenue independent of either output or capital-At first, this seems like the right approach.
The two parties want the producer to pick the efficient capital stock so as to minimize the expected cost of producing whatever level of output the purchasers decide to take. Maximizing profit might then seem to be equivalent to minimizing cost. A particularly interesting and simple way to provide the firm with the right incentives is to make revenue a fixed amount, D (w,r) , per unit of output. Then R'Q,K,w,r) = Qt(w,r)
This formula provides no direct reward for investment but can 
Contracts to provide both output and capital efficiency
The type of contract considered in this paper is most at home when one producer sells to many buyers. When the buyers have the unilateral power to determine the quantities they take, the producer need not be concerned with the circumstances of each of the many purchasers. Instead, the producer should offer a standardized contract to each buyer. This section shows that such contracts can provide both output and capital efficiency.
Key to the functioning of the contracts is the notion that each buyer is small enough so that its purchases do not affect marginal cost. Efficiency is approximate in exactly the same way that the efficiency of competitive equilibrium is approximate----participants are unaware of their small amount of monopsony power. The standardized contract studied here has the form Rt (qs,Q,K,w,r' = Aq1,Q,K,w,r) + ssBQ,K.w,r) with A C',ü,K,w,r) = C'.
Differences among customers are captured by the quantity they purchase, q , and a scale variable, sj; in all other respects, al 1 customers have the same contract -The scale var jab 1 es sum to unity: Es, = 1.. Linearity in the s means that the producer's revenue is independent of the 5j The approximate concept of output efficiency is expressed in Definition.
A contract is output-efficient for a small purchaser if A(q,Q,K,w,r) = qt
That is, the purchaser pays marginal cost for q1, but the role of qi in total output, Q, is ignored.
This definition saves some tedious arguments later, none of which is a departure from the same development of the efficiency of competitive equilibrium.
Output efficiency restricts the form of the standardized contract:
Theorem 5. A standardized contract is output-efficient for a small purchaser if and only if it can be written in the form A(q± ,D,F(,w,r) s18(Q,K,w,r) = -s±o)-,g s1RUJ,K,w,r)
R is an unrestricted function.
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Output efficiency requires that the payment made by a single purchaser be a linear function of the quantity purchased.
The coefficient of qi must be marginal cost.
Again, output efficiency calls for marginal-cost pricing..
In the standardized contract, each purchaser makes a payment, ssR(Q,K,w,r), independent of the quantity it purchases.
It makes a further payment to the extent its purchase, qj exceeds its prescribed share of total output, 5j0.
Output efficiency requires that the payment for the extra output be at marginal cost, and also that the purchaser earn a reward at marginal cost for taking less than its share. In words, the purchaser and the producer agree on a normal share of total output. If the purchaser elects to take exactly its normal share, it pays long-run unit cost. Even in product markets, the stabilization of unit revenue in a transaction at an early stage of production may introduce problems at later stages. If the published price of a raw material is actually stabilized unit revenue, then the contract between a producer of a product for which the raw material is an input and a downstream purchaser cannot be made appropriately contingent on marginal cost.
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Appendix. Proofs of theorems.
Theorems 1 and 2 follow immediately from the assumptions a-f strict concavity, differentiability, and saturation.
Theorem 3.
A contract with revenue formula R(Q,K,w,r) provides capital efficiency only if
,K
Cx u}
Further, if a formula satisfies this condition for u=1 and all w and r, it satisfies it for all u, w, and r.
Proof:
The first-order condition -for maximum profit is R &C Q R C as asserted.
